FOURTH AMENDMENT BALANCING ACT: SPECIAL NEEDS
OF RAPE VICTIMS JUSTIFY COURT-ORDERED HIV
TESTING OF THE ACCUSED
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides all people with protection from unreasonable searches and seizures conducted by the government.' The precise meaning of the
Fourth Amendment is elusive, though, given that the exact relationship between the unreasonable Search and Seizures clause and the
Warrant Clause is unknown.3 Through all of the uncertainty surrounding Fourth Amendment protection, however, one thing is
definite: The Fourth Amendment is limited to protecting against
those searches and seizures deemed to be unreasonable.4
In 1987, the Supreme Court held that a search and seizure is
proper under the Fourth Amendment if either the Warrant Clause
requirements are met or the search and seizure passes the reasonSee U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id

See id. The Warrant Clause states, "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Id. At the time the Constitution was drafted, Americans had not forgotten the general warrants issued by the
Crown and exercised by British officers on the colonists. See Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 584 n.21 (1980). These warrants, known as writs of assistance, allowed unfettered searches intended to uncover goods imported in contravention of English
tax law. See id The Warrant Clause was inserted into the Constitution as part of the
Fourth Amendment to protect Americans from the issuance of similar general warrants by the United States government. See id. at 583.
See William A. Schroeder, Restoring the Status Quo Ante: The Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule as a Compensatory Device, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 633, 634 (1983).
The Fourth Amendment itself does not indicate how the two clauses should interact.
See id. at 634-35. In turn, this has led to an ever-changing understanding of the application of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 635.
4 See Thomas K. Clancy, Wat Does the FourthAmendment Protect: Property, Privacy,
or Security?, 33 WAK FOREST L. REV. 307, 308 (1998). Clancy writes that it is essential
that one have the ability to exclude the government from unreasonable intrusions in
order to have the right to be secure. See id,
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ableness balancing test.5 By adopting the reasonableness standard as
a substitute for the Warrant Clause's probable cause requirements,
the Court. introduced
even more uncertainty into Fourth Amend•
6
ment jurisprudence. Given that balancing tests are influenced by
the subjective beliefs of the person administering them, any application of the reasonableness test is thus swayed by the individual ideals
and beliefs of the judge who applies it in the absence of objective judicial directives .
The protections provided by the Fourth Amendment center
around the preservation of one's privacy. 8 In determining Fourth
5 See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987). In
the plurality opinion,
Justice O'Connor reiterated that, except in some well-defined instances, the requirements of the Warrant Clause must be satisfied. See id. The Court in Ortega
stated that the Warrant Clause was inappropriate "[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." Id. at 720
(quoting NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(alteration in original)).
The Court has stated that in applying the reasonableness standard courts must
balance the government's interests involved, the degree of intrusion involved in the
challenged search, and the amount of privacy expectation that inheres in the thing

being searched. See Scott E. Sundby, A Return to FourthAmendment Basics: Undoing the

Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REv. 383, 429 (1988).

6 See Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement:

Resuscitating the

Fourth Amendment, 44VAND. L. REv. 473, 511 (1991). Under the reasonableness test,
the Fourth Amendment provides amorphous protection given that what may be
deemed reasonable in the mind of one judge is not necessarily reasonable in the
mind of another judge. See id. The subjective nature of the reasonableness test
leads Bookspan to call it a "standardless standard." See id. at 510.
7 See National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 681 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that the question of reasonableness will
depend largely on the social need prompting the search when a balancing test is applied. See id. Scholars have written that the outcome of a case involving the Fourth
Amendment depends largely on how a specific judge decides to weigh the evidence
because there is no specific balancing method. See Kenneth Nuger, The Special Needs
Rationale: Creating a Chasm in FourthAmendment Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 89,
120 (1992). There is frequent criticism that the Court has failed to outline any objective guidelines for application of balancing tests. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing,96 YALE L.J. 943, 972 (1987).

In the absence

of any clear directives, courts are able to turn to a number of sources during the application of a balancing test including social trends, history, and the value of the
questioned action in accomplishing constitutional goals. See id. at 974; see also
Sundby, supra note 5, at 429-30 (noting that the Court should set forth specific standards to help guide the application of the Fourth Amendment).
SeeJames J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 670 (1985). In
8

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court set aside the view that the
Fourth Amendment protected locations and held that the Fourth Amendment protects one's reasonable expectations that something is private. See Tomkovicz, supra
at 650. The Katz Court stated that it is misdirected to characterize Fourth Amend-
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Amendment challenges, courts have recognized the intimate nature
of information contained in a personal medical file and have provided such information with privacy protections. 9 However, this privacy protection, similar to the Fourth Amendment's protection from
searches and seizures, is not absolute.' ° Disclosure of one's medical
information has been allowed when societal interests in disclosure
outweigh the privacy interests in maintaining confidentiality." This
very same balancing test applies to issues surrounding the disclosure
of one's Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)-status in a criminal
trial. 2 In fact, given the magnitude of the HIV epidemic, courts tend
to give substantial weight to the governmental interest whenever the
government invokes
public health concerns as a reason for disclosing
3
one's HIV status.

ment protection in terms of the location sought to be protected. See Katz, 389 U.S.
at 351. The Court noted, "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id
See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d
Cir.
1980). The Third Circuit noted that in various contexts special protection has been
given to medical records. See id. The court explained that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure place a higher burden on discovering medical records than they do on
discovering other information. See id. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 35 with FED. R.Crv. P.
26(b). The court stated that the Freedom of Information Act has a special exception for medical files. See id.(citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976)). The court took
the special treatment given to medical records to reflect the private nature of medical records. See id.
10 See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577-78. The Third Circuit noted that personal
control of one's medical files is not absolute. See id. The court stated that legislatures and other courts have determined that public health concerns may allow disclosure of portions of one's medical history. See id. The court noted that the Supreme Court has provided examples of those intrusions into one's medical records
that have been accepted, including the practices of disclosing personal medical information to doctors, hospitals, insurance companies, and public health agencies.
See id. (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977)). The court stated that reporting statutes pertaining to sexually transmitted diseases, child abuse, and fetal
death certifications are all integral parts of modern medical practice. See i. (citing
Walen, 429 U.S. at 602 n.29).
I See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 315-17 (1979). Courts have denied intrusion into one's medical records if the societal interest in disclosure outweighs the interest in preserving one's privacy. See id. In Detroit Edison, the Court
determined that the union's interest in obtaining employees' scores on psychological aptitude tests to assist in handling grievances was outweighed by the interest of
both the employees and Detroit Edison in keeping those medical records private.
See id.
1
See Roger Doughty, Comment, The Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information:
Responding to the Resurgence of Aggressive Public Health Interventions in the AIDS Epidemic,
82 CALIF. L. REv. 111, 151 (1994).
1sSee id.
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Court-ordered HIV testing on convicted or accused sexual offenders raises two significant constitutional issues: the violation of
the right to privacy' and the violation of the Fourth Amendment' 5
right against unreasonable governmental searches and seizures. '16 In
examining the constitutionality of HIV-testing statutes, courts apply
the "special needs" analysis.1 7 This "special needs" analysis requires a
court to balance the rights of the individual against the interests of
the government to determine if a search is reasonable. 8 When a special need is found to exist, the "special needs" test dispenses with the
requirement of securing a warrant prior to conducting a search and
the necessity of showing individualized suspicion 9 to make that
search reasonable. 0

14 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (recognizing that there
exists an unwritten right to privacy in the shadows of certain enumerated constitutional rights).
15 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also supra, note 1 (setting
forth the text of the

Fourth Amendment).
16 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 767 (1966). The Supreme Court
held that involuntary blood testing did constitute a Fourth Amendment search and
seizure. See id. In Schmerber, while a drunk driver was in the hospital being treated
for his injuries, a blood sample was taken to test his intoxication level. See id. at 75859. Schmerber challenged the admissibility of that blood test because the blood was
taken without a warrant. See id. at 759.
17
See Bernadette Pratt Sadler, Comment, When Rape Victims' Rights Meet Privacy
Rights: MandatoryHIV Testing, Strikingthe Fourth Amendment Balance, 67 WASH. L. REV.
195, 200-01 (1992). The "special needs" doctrine first appeared in the concurring
opinion written by Justice Blackmun in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), and
the Supreme Court explicitly adopted the "special needs" analysis in O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). See Sean Anderson, Individual Privacy Interests and the
"Special Needs" Analysis for Involuntary Drug and HIV Tests, 86 CAL. L. REV. 119, 129
(1998). In T.L.O., Justice Blackmun wrote, "I believe that we have used such a balancing test, rather than strictly applying the Fourth Amendment's Warrant and
Probable-Cause Clause, only when we are confronted with 'a special law enforcement need for greater flexibility."' T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 514 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
18 SeeSadler, supra note 17, at 201.
9 See Myron Schreck, The Fourth Amendment in the Public Schools: Issues for the
1990s and Beyond, 25 UIRB. LAw. 117, 129 (1993). Individualized suspicion refers to
the belief that a specific person committed a crime or may be in the possession of
evidence of a crime. See id.
20
See Lisa Simotas, Note, In Search of a Balance: AIDS, Rape, and the Special Needs
Doctrine, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1881, 1894 (1991). Originally, the "special needs" test required that the search be reasonable at its inception premised on a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, as well as a reasonable relationship between the scope of the
search and the need that was advanced by that search. See id.at 1893-94. In 1989,
the Supreme Court eliminated the need of individualized suspicion. See id. at 1894.
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The HIV epidemic introduced itself to the United States on June
5, 1981 .1 Initially, the disease manifested itself exclusively in homosexual men, but by January of 1983, Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS)23 found its way into the heterosexual community
and mainstream America.24 This discovery set off a medical and emotional crisis throughout the country and around the worldY.
By September of 1993, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC),
which tracks the spread of HIV and AIDS, had received 328,392 reports of AIDS.26 By 1994, the cumulative AIDS statistics from the
21

See

GERALD J.

STINE, ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME:

BIOLOGICAL,

6 (2d ed. 1996). On June 5, 1981 the first cases of
AIDS-related illness were documented in five homosexual men in Los Angeles, California. See id.
SOCIAL, MEDICALAND LEGAL ISSUES

2

See id.

See Simotas, supra note 20, at 1885. AIDS is caused by the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) that attacks critical types of white blood cells that are crucial to
the way the immune system responds. See id. AIDS progresses through a series of
three stages. See id.In the first stage, the person infected exhibits no symptoms. See
id. The second stage is known as AIDS-related complex and is defined by the manifestation of minor symptoms including fatigue, weight loss, and fever. See id. at 1886.
The final stage is known as full-blown AIDS. See id. AIDS is terminal due to an extensive reduction in white blood cells that leaves the victim helpless to fight diseases.
See id.
24 See STINE, supra note 21, at 6-7.
In January of 1983, two American females,
both of whom were the sex partners of intravenous drug users, were diagnosed with
AIDS. See id, From that point on, the spread of AIDS has gained momentum. See id.
at 7. For comparison, statistically, the first 50,000 cases of AIDS took seven years to
be reported to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). See id. The seventh and
eighth 50,000 cases of AIDS, however, each took only six months to be reported. See
id. The spread has only been slowed minimally, as the ninth and tenth 50,000 cases
of AIDS reported took an estimated ten months in 1995 and 1996. See id. But see
Update: Trends in AIDS Incidence - United States, 1996, 278 JAMA 1485 (1997). During 1996, the incidence of AIDS reported to the CDC declined almost universally in
all populations and in all locations. See id. The report credits recent improvements
in HIV care in preventing HIV from progressing into AIDS. See id. Despite this decline, the data indicated that incidence of AIDS in 1996 remained high and AIDSrelated complications remained one of the leading causes of death among people 25
to 44 years of age. See id. at 1486.
25 See STINE, supra note 21, at 2, 4. The onset of AIDS has made such a definite
impression on the minds of the general public that almost a third of the population
defines AIDS or a similar plague as the "greatest threat to human life." Id. at 2
(quoting a 1994 Louis Harris poll). As the count of people afflicted by this deadly
disease continues to rise, the fear surrounding HIV and AIDS continues to grow. See
Sadler, supra note 17 at 195.
26 See HIVAIDS, SURVEILLANCE REPORT (CDC, Atlanta, Ga.),
Oct. 1993 at 3
[hereinafter SURVEILLANcE REPORT]. This number includes the 50 states and does
not account for territories of the United States. See id. If the statistics included U.S.
territories, the CDC received 339,250 reports of AIDS through September of 1993.
See id. Between 1981 and 1983, the CDC had separated HIV and AIDS cases according to certain social behaviors and medical needs. See STINE, supra note 21, at 270.
The groupings included "(1) homosexual and bisexual men; (2) injection drug us23
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CDC showed that 7% of AIDS cases occurred in the heterosexual
community; 31% occurred among intravenous drug users and their
heterosexual or homosexual partners; and
2 7 53% occurred in the homosexual and bisexual male community.
NewJersey amassed the fifth highest total of AIDS cases reported
to the CDC by any state in the union, behind New York, California,
Florida, and Texas. 8 Since the inception of the AIDS epidemic, New
Jersey has notified the CDC of 36,641 cases of AIDS.2 As of March
31, 1998, more than 25,000 citizens of New Jersey were living with
AIDS or HV.30 In 1996 alone, more than 2000 AIDS-related deaths

occurred in New Jersey.3' Given the importance of controlling the
spread of AIDS, New Jersey labeled prevention and control of the virus a priority issue on its health agenda.2
ers; (3) hemophiliacs; (4) blood transfusion recipients; (5) heterosexuals; and (6)
children whose parents are at risk." Id However, members of high-risk groups can
and do spread HIV infection through their relationships with lower risk groups. See
id.
27 SeeSTINE, supra note
21, at 272.
28 See Table 2: AIDS Cases by State of Residence Reported to
CDC as of June 30, 1998,
NEW JERSEY HIV/AIDS QUARTERLY NEWSLETrER (Div. of AIDS Prevention and Control) (June 30, 1998) <http://www.state.nj.us/health/aids/qtr/9806.htm>. NewJersey has reported 36,638 adult and adolescent cases of AIDS to the CDC, or 6% of the
national cases reported since June of 1981, and 704 cases of children with AIDS to
the CDC, or 9% of the national cases reported. See id.
29 See Table 1: New Jersey AIDS Cases Reported July
1997-June 1998 and Cumulative
Totals as of June 30, 1998/Age at diagnosis, by Sex, NEW JERSEY HIV/AIDS QuARTERLY
NEWSLETrER (Div. of AIDS Prevention and Control)
(June 30, 1998)
<http://www.state.nj.us/health/aids/qtr/9806.htm>. The CDC broke down the reported incidents of AIDS in metropolitan areas consisting of more than a population
of 500,000. See SURVEILLANcE REPORT, supra note 26, at 4-5. The CDC reported in
1993 that Bergen and Passaic counties, N.J. recorded 2,476 incidents of AIDS;Jersey
City, N.J. reported 3,001 incidents of AIDS through 1993; Middlesex County, N.J.
reported 1,548 cases of AIDS through 1993; and Newark, N.J. reported 7,413 incidents of AIDS through 1993. See id. at 4.
30 See Table 10: Persons Living with HIV Infection (not
AIDS) and with AIDS, by New
Jersey County/Cumulative Data as of June 30, 1998, NEW JERSEY HIV/AIDS QUARTERLY
NEWSLETTER (Div. of AIDS Prevention and Control) (June 30, 1998)
<http://www.state.nj.us/health/aids/qtr/9806.htm>. The Division of AIDS Prevention and Control broke down the cumulative number of people diagnosed with HIV
in New Jersey by county. See id. Approximately 12,600 people live with HIV in New
Jersey and 13,200 live with AIDS. See id. By far, Essex County has the highest concentration of people living with HIV and AIDS in NewJersey (30%). See id.
31 See Figure 2: New Jersey AIDS Cases as ofJune 30, 1998/Number of Deaths
by Year of
Death, NEWJERSEY H1V/AIDS QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER (Div. of AIDS Prevention and
Control) (june 30, 1998) <http:www.state.nj.us/health/aids/qtr/9806.htm>. The
number of AIDS-related deaths appears to have decreased in recent years. See id.
22 See N.J. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND SENIOR SERVICES,
1995 NEW JERSEY HEALTH

STATISTICS 155 (Feb. 1998). NewJersey set a goal of limiting the HIV infection death
rate in 25- to 44-year-olds to approximately 30 per 100,000 by the year 2000. See id.
However, the report noted that it is difficult to set goals that may be realized within a

1100

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1094

The AIDS epidemic has increased the trauma involved with sexual victimization by compounding physical violation with the threat
of acquiring HIV. 3 3 These fears are well-founded because physical
trauma increases the likelihood that an HIV-infected attacker will
transmit the virus to a victim. 3 4 The risk of HIV transmission during

rape may also be increased by some sexual offenders' high-risk behavior, such as intravenous
drug use and homosexual activity in the
35
environment.
prison
In an effort to compel the states to enact some form of courtordered HIV testing for accused or convicted sex offenders, Congress
passed section 1804 of the Crime Control Act of 1990. 36 This legislation allows the federal government to withhold federal funds from
states that fail to enact laws requiring convicted sex offenders to be
tested for HIV at the request of their victims.37 The law further mandecade because AIDS-related deaths in the present decade occur in individuals infected with HIV in a previous decade. See id. This latency period allows individuals
infected with HIV during the past decades to die in the current and coming decades. See id.
33 See CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, MORE HARM THAN HELP: THE RAMIFICATIONS FOR RAPE SURVIVORS OF MANDATORY HIV TESTING OF RAPISTS 3 (1981) (citing

Baker et al., Rape Victims' Concerns About Possible Exposure to HIV Infection, 5 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 49 (1990)). Incidents of rape have increased more than any
other violent crime since 1980. See id. In 1996, the Uniform Crime Reports for the
United States reported the occurrence of 95,769 rapes. See FBI, 1996 UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 23 (1997).

In 1997, the State of New Jersey

alone reported 1730 rapes. See Robert Schwaneberg, Violence Down Across State:
Credit Goes to Additional Cops, STAR-LEDGER, Aug. 12, 1998, at 1.
34 See Paul H. MacDonald, Note, AIDS, Rape, and the Fourth
Amendment: Schemes
for Mandatory AIDS Testing of Sex Offenders, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1607, 1630 (1990).
35 See id. at 1630-31. Prison inmates are almost two times
as likely to have used
and abused intravenous drugs than are people in the general population. See id. at
1631. Almost 30% of the national prison population engages in homosexual acts
and somewhere between 9% and 20% of inmates are victims of prison rape. See id.
36 See Allison N. Blender, Note, Testing the Fourth Amendment
for Infection: Mandatory AIDS and HIV Testing of Criminal Defendants at the Request of a Victim of Sexual Assault, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 467, 477 (1997). At the time this federal legislation
was passed, approximately one-third of the states had already enacted HIV-testing
statutes. See id. at 477-78. However, Congress desired that all states have such pro-

tections. See id.
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 3756(f) (1994). Subsection (f) provides:
(1) For any fiscal year beginning more than 2 years after November
29,1990(A) 90 percent of the funds allocated under subsection (a) of
this section without regard to this subsection to a State de-

scribed in paragraph (2) shall be distributed by the Director to
such State; and

(B) 10 percent of such funds shall be allocated equally among
States that are not affected by the operation of subparagraph

(A).
(2) Paragraph (1) (A) refers to a State that does not have in effect, and
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dates that the state disclose the test results to the victim 8 and provide
proper counseling."
Prompted by this federal legislation, the New Jersey State Legislature enacted its court-ordered HIV-testing provisions in 1993.40
These statutes provide that all persons, regardless of age, charged
does not enforce, in such fiscal year, a law that requires the State at the
request of the victim of a sexual act (A) to administer, to the defendant convicted under State law
of such sexual act, a test to detect in such defendant the presence of the etiologic agent for acquired immune deficiency
syndrome;
(B) to disclose the results of such test to such defendant and to
the victim of such sexual act; and
(C) to provide to the victim of such sexual act counseling regarding HIV disease, HIV testing, in accordance with applicable
law, and referral for appropriate health care and support services.
(3) For purposes of this subsection (A) the term "convicted" includes adjudicated under juvenile
proceedings; and
(B) the term "sexual act" has the meaning given such term in
subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 2245(1) of Title 18.
Id.
See STINE, supra note 21, at 467. The increased popularity of court-ordered
HIV and AIDS testing and disclosure of those test results to sexual-assault victims
places doctors in legal and ethical limbo between their obligation to preserve a patient's privacy and their duty to protect society as a whole. See id. Historically, the
relationship between a patient and healthcare provider has existed within a scope of
privacy bolstered by the Hippocratic Oath taken by doctors. SeeJo ANNE CZECOWSKI
BRUCE, PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIAITY OF HEALTH CARE INFORMATION 1-3 (2d ed. 1988).
The Hippocratic Oath states in part, "'Whatsoever I shall see or hear in the course of
my profession, in my intercourse with men, if it is that which should not be broadcast about, I will never divulge it but consider it a holy secret."' STINE, supra note 21,
at 469 (quoting the Hippocratic Oath).
39
See 42 U.S.C. § 3756(f).
40
See Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to Assembly Committee Substitutefor Assembly, Nos. 897 and 220,June 14, 1993. The New Jersey Senate Judiciary Committee
specifically stated in its report to the assembly that the passage of bills 897 and 220
would bring New Jersey into compliance with the federal funding conditions set
forth in the Crime Control Act of 1990. See id.
Assembly Bill 897 included the provision that requires juveniles convicted of actions which, but for the age of the perpetrator, constitute sexual assault or aggravated sexual assault, to submit to testing for sexually transmitted diseases, including
HIV. See A. 897, 205th Legis., 2d Sess. (N.J. 1993). The provisions of Bill 897 eventually were modified and codified into the New Jersey Statutes. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:43-2.2 (West Supp. 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-43.1 (West 1995). Assembly
Bill 220, in its original form, allowed a person arrested for various types of sexual
and drug offenses voluntarily to submit to HIV testing. See A. 220, 205th Legis., 2d
Sess. (N.J. 1993). The bill also incorporated mandatory HIV testing for any person
convicted of the above-stated offenses. See id Assembly Bill 220 was also modified
and incorporated into the New Jersey Statutes. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-2.2; N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-43.1.
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with a crime for actions covered by the definition of sexual assault or
aggravated sexual assault are subject to the same HLV-testing laws. 4'
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-2.2(a). The statute provides in relevant part:
a. In addition to any other disposition made pursuant to law, a
court shall order a person convicted of, indicted for or formally
charged with, or a juvenile charged with delinquency or adjudicated
delinquent for an act which if committed by an adult would constitute
aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault as defined in subsection a.
or c. of N.J.S. 2C:14-2 to submit to an approved serological test for acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) or infection with the
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or any other related virus identified as a probable causative agent of AIDS. The court shall issue such
an order only upon the request of the victim and upon application of
the prosecutor made at the time of indictment, charge, conviction or
adjudication of delinquency. The person or juvenile shall be ordered
by the court to submit to such repeat or confirmatory tests as may be
medically necessary.
As used in this section, "formal charge" includes a proceeding by
accusation in the event that the defendant has waived the right to an

indictment.
b. A court order issued pursuant to subsection a. of this section
shall require testing to be performed as soon as practicable by the
Commissioner of the Department of Corrections pursuant to authority
granted to the commissioner by sections 6 and 10 of P.L.1976, c.98
(C.30:1B-6 and 30:1B-10), by a provider of health care, at a health facility licensed pursuant to section 12 of P.L.1971, c.136 (C.26:2H-12) or
the Juvenile Justice Commission established pursuant to section 2 of
P.L.1995, c.284 (C.52:17B-170). The order shall also require that the
results of the test be reported to the offender and to the appropriate
Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy ....
e. Upon receipt of the result of a test ordered pursuant to subsection a. of this section, the Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy shall provide the victim with appropriate counseling, referral for counseling
and if appropriate, referral for health care. The office shall notify the
victim or make appropriate arrangements for the victim to be notified
of the test result.
f. The result of a test ordered pursuant to subsection a. of this
section shall be confidential and employees of the Department of Corrections, the Juvenile Justice Commission, the Office of Victim-Witness
Advocacy, a health care provider, health care facility or counseling
service shall not disclose the result of a test performed pursuant to this
section except as authorized herein or as otherwise authorized by law
or court order. The provisions of this section shall not be deemed to
prohibit disclosure of a test result to the person tested.
Id.
N.J. Stat. Ann § 2A:4A-43.1 specifically provides that:
In accordance with section 4 of P.L.1993, c. 364 (C.2C:43-2.2) and
in addition to any other disposition authorized pursuant to N.J.S.
2A:4A-43, a court shall order a juvenile charged with delinquency or
adjudicated delinquent for an act which if committed by an adult
would constitute aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault as defined
in subsection a. or c. of N.J.S. 2C:14-2 to submit to an approved serological test for acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) or infec-
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It is important to understand the nature of HIV tests in order
fully to understand the backdrop against which legal issues arising
under statutory testing schemes must be analyzed.42 HIV tests do not
actually test for the virus itself, but rather for the antibodies associated with the presence of HIV in the body. 43 The enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) test is the first test performed on a blood
sample undergoing HIV evaluation.* Using modern technology, the
ELISA test has a specificity rate45 of nearly 99.8%." The ELISA test is
typically performed twice on a blood sample in an effort to ensure
the test's accuracy. 7 If both ELISA tests return a negative reading,
the HIV test is reported as negative.48 If either administration of the
ELISA test returns a positive result, then the more accurate and more
costly Western Blot test is performed for confirmation purposes.49
Recently, State ex rel. j G., NS. andj T. 50 afforded the New Jersey
Supreme Court the opportunity to review the NewJersey statutes that
permit court-ordered HIV testing for accused or convicted sex oftion with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or any other related virus identified as a probable causative agent of AIDS.
Id.
42

See Simotas, supra note 20, at 1884.

43 See STINE, supra note 21,
at 328.

See id. at 333. There are some significant problems with the enzyme-linkedimmunosorbent assay (ELISA) test and its use in detecting the presence of HIV in
the general population. See id. The primary assumption of the ELISA test is that
every person infected with HIV will produce HIV antibodies. See id. However, HIV
antibodies do not generally appear in a person infected with HIV for approximately
six weeks to one year, although the antibodies are usually present within a period of
six to 18 weeks. See id. This will lead to a false negative test result in those individuals still in that broad latency phase. See id. It is also scientifically possible that the
ELISA test will produce a false positive result, showing the presence of HV antibodies where there are none. See id. A false positive can show up in people with liver
disease, people who have given birth to several children, people who have recently
had flu or hepatitis B vaccinations, and people who have a history of intravenous
drug use. See id.
See id. at 491. The specificity of a test refers to the probability of a negative
reading when there is no HIV present in the body. See id.
4
See id. at 333. The Red Cross in its use of the ELISA test achieved the 99.8%
specificity rate in the capacity for which it was originally intended: to screen the nation's blood supply for HV. See id.
47 See id.
48

See id

49 See STINE, supra note 21, at 333. The Western Blot test does not have an accuracy rate of 100%, but if administered properly, it can come extremely close to having an accuracy of perfection. See id at 335. The Western Blot test takes more time
to complete, requires more labor, and costs significantly more. See id The estimates
show that the cost of administering the ELISA test is less than $50, while the cost of
administering the Western Blot test is more than $120. See id. at 339.
151 N.J. 565, 701 A.2d 1260 (1997).
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fenders. 5 The court held that judicially mandated HIV testing of all

individuals accused or convicted of actions fulfilling the definition of
sexual assault does not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution or Article I, Paragraphs 152 and 7" of the New Jersey Constitution. 4 The court stipulated, however, that there must be
probable cause to conclude that accused or convicted sex offenders
exposed their victims to circumstances under which HIV might be
transmitted.5 5
In 1994, the State of NewJersey filed complaints in the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, against three juveniles, ages
fourteen to fifteen.56 The State alleged that on May 7, 1994 the juveniles, identified in court documents asJ.G., N.S., andJ.T., committed
aggravated sexual assault 57 when they forced a ten-year-old, mentally
retarded girl to engage in anal and oral acts of sexual conduct. 5 The
victim requested that the court compel her assailants to submit to
tests for HIV and
any other related condition identified as a causal
59
agent of AIDS.
The defendants opposed the State's motion for court-ordered
HIV testing. f o They alleged that such testing violated the Fourth and

51 See id at 575, 701 A.2d at 1265.
52 See N.J. CONsT. art. I, 1 1. Article 1, paragraph 1, provides, "All persons
are by

nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights,
among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." Id.
53 See N.J. CONST. art. I, 1 7. Article I, paragraph 7, provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the papers and things to be seized.
Id
SeejG., 151 N.J. at 570, 701 A.2d at 1262.
55 See id.
See State ex rel. J.G., N.S. and J.T., 283 N.J. Super. 32, 35-36, 660 A.2d 1274,
1276 (Ch. Div. 1995).
57 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2a(1) (West 1995). This provision provides, "An
actor is guilty of aggravated sexual assault if he commits an act of sexual penetration
with another person under any of the following circumstances: (1) The victim is less
than 13 years old .. " Id.
SeejG., 283 N.J. Super. at 35-36, 660 A.2d at 1276 (Ch. Div. 1995). Prosecutors filed the complaint against J.G. on July 13, 1994, against N.S. on July 20, 1994,
and againstJ.T. on October
18, 1994. See id. at 36 n.1.
5 See id. at 36, 660 A.2d at 1276.
See id. at 37, 660 A.2d at 1276.
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Fourteenth Amendments6 ' to the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraphs 1 and 7 of the NewJersey Constitution.
The chancery division held an evidentiary hearing on this matter."' The defendants presented three expert witnesses to address the
methods currently available for HIV testing and medical treatment
and psychological counseling presently used for possible exposure to
HIV." First, Dr. Oleske 5 testified that an HIV test is not beneficial
given that it does not indicate the HIV status of the attacker at the
time of the attack or whether HIV was transmitted to the victim. 66
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment
provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
The Supreme Court determined, beginning as early as 1897 and gathering
momentum considerably in the 1960s, that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the protections of the Bill of Rights to the states. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 86-87 (1990). Specifically, this concept of incorporation makes the Fourth Amendment applicable to the states. See id. at 87.
2
SeeJ.G., 283 N.J. Super. at 37, 660 A.2d at 1276. The New Jersey Supreme
Court has found that Article I, Paragraphs 1 and 7 of the New Jersey Constitution
afford greater protection to NewJersey citizens than does the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. See State v. Pierce, 136 N.J. 184, 209, 642 A.2d 947,
960 (1994). In Pierce, the court explained:
"The United States Supreme Court, charged as it is with establishing a
basic level of protection for the entire nation, often is obliged to establish a lowest common denominator of such protection. The federalist
system contemplates that state courts may grant greater protection to
fundamental rights than is accorded under the federal constitution.
When a state supreme court grants such protection, it does no more
than fulfill its obligation to uphold is own constitution."
Id. (quoting State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 52-53, 573 A.2d 1376, 1386 (1990) (Pollock,
J., concurring).
63 Seej.G., 283 N.J. Super. at 37, 660 A.2d
at 1277.
6 See
id.
65 See id. Dr.James Oleske is the director of the Division of Allergy,
Immunology
and Infectious Disease at the University of Medicine and Dentistry, New Jersey
Medical School. See id.
See id. at 42, 660 A.2d at 1279-80. Oleske stated that a negative test, due to
the
latency period of HIV, would not prove that the offender was not HIV positive at the
time of the attack. See id. at 40, 660 A.2d at 1278. The doctor further recounted that
regardless of the offender's HIV status, because not every sexual encounter with a
person infected with HIV results in the infection of the sex partner, knowing the offender's HIV status does not tell anything about the HIV status of the victim. See
State ex rel. J.G., N.S. and J.T., 289 N.J. Super. 575, 579-80, 674 A.2d 625, 627 (App.
Div. 1996).
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Next, the defendants presented Patricia Kloser 67 who testified that the
HIV status of an attacker does not change the prescribed treatment
for a victim of sexual assault.& Finally, Dr. Greenbaum 69 testified that
knowing the HIV status of an attacker is not beneficial to the emotional healing of a sexual-assault victim. 70 The State offered no witnesses on its behalf, nor did it submit any evidence for considera-

tion.7'
The court determined that the "special needs" doctrine72 provided the most appropriate analysis of whether the governmental interest in HIV testing of accused sex offenders outweighed the individual's privacy interests." Applying this balancing test, the chancery
division determined that New Jersey's court-ordered HIV-testing statutes failed sufficiently to advance the compelling state interest for
which they were enacted and thus violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.74 In view of
this, the court did not extend its inquiry into any possible violation of
the New Jersey Constitution. 75

SeeJ.G., 283 N.J. Super. at 38, 660 A.2d at 1277. Dr. Koser is the medical
director of AIDS services and associate professor of both Clinical and Preventative
Medicine at New Jersey Medical School. See id
6
See id. at 46, 660 A.2d at 1281.
69 See id.
at 38-39, 660 A.2d at 1277-78. Dr. Greenbaum, executive director of the
New Jersey Coalition Against Sexual Assault, has extensive experience in helping
rape victims cope with their post-attack trauma. See id.
70 See id at 48, 660 A.2d at 1283. According to Greenbaum,
in order for sexualassault victims to recover, they must separate themselves from their attackers. See id,
at 47, 660 A.2d at 1283. Greenbaum agreed with Oleske that the HIV status of the
attacker is not indicative of the HIV status of the victim and thus is not informative
for the victim in any way. See id. at 48, 660 A.2d at 1283.
71 See id. at 39, 660 A.2d at
1278.
See supranotes 5 & 20 (discussing the "special needs" analysis).
73 See J.G., 283 N.J. Super. at 50, 660 A.2d at 1284. In
applying the "special
needs" test, the court determined that this particular practice of drawing a person's
blood and testing it for HIV was a search and seizure of the most intrusive kind. See
id. at 52, 660 A.2d at 1285. The court next determined that protecting and advancing the interests of victims having been violated by sexual assault was a legitimate
and compelling state interest. See id. at 53, 660 A.2d at 1285. Finally, the court
looked to whether the interference with the fundamental rights of the accused sex
offender was narrowly tailored to advance the compelling state interest. See id.
74 See id. at 54-55, 660 A.2d at 1286. Using the
testimony of the three experts, the
court determined that if a defendant tests negative it does not mean that the defendant does not have HIV. See id. at 53-54, 660 A.2d at 1286. Thus, the court concluded, the result of an HIV test should have no bearing on a victim's mental state
or medical treatment. See id. at 54, 660 A.2d at 1286. The court, therefore, determined that the testing scheme is not narrowly tailored to serve the intent for which
it was enacted. See id
75 See id
67
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The State appealed, and the S appellate
division held that the
•
76
HIV-testing scheme was constitutional.
In making this determination, the court noted that the testing provided a sexual-assault victim
with relevant information that might serve to mitigate his or her fears
over the possible exposure to HIV."

The court concluded that the

testing serves the public interest by protecting the health and safety
of both the offender and the victim.78 The court determined that this

public interest outweighed the privacy interests of the offender.
The court remanded the case to the chancery division to order the
defendants to submit to blood testing.80
The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification 8 ' to determine the constitutionality of New Jersey's court-ordered HIVtesting statutes. 8" After balancing the accused sexual offender's interest in non-disclosure of his or her H1V status against the potential
emotional and medical benefits of disclosure to a victim, the court
held that the victim's interests outweighed those of the accused and
that the statutes were constitutional."' The court affirmed the appellate court's holding, modifying it only to add that there must be
probable cause to conclude that the victim was exposed to the risk of
HIV transmission for the court to compel H1V testing.m The supreme court also addressed the constitutionality of testing a person
indicted, but not yet convicted, of sexual assault.8" Because the indictment necessitates a finding of probable cause that the suspect
committed sexual assault, the court found no due process violation.86
The Fourth Amendment stands as a guarantor of privacy, dignity, and protection from arbitrary and intrusive actions that might
be taken by the government by requiring government actors to se76

See State ex rel. J.G., N.S. andJ.T., 289 N.J. Super. 575, 592, 674 A.2d 625, 633-

34 (App. Div. 1996).
See id., 674 A.2d at 633.
78

See id.

See id.
o See id., 674 A.2d at 633-34.
81 See State ex rel.J.G., N.S. andJ.T., 146 N.J. 70, 679 A.2d 656 (1996).
82 See State ex rel. J.G., N.S., and J.T., 151 N.J. 565, 575, 701 A.2d 1260, 1265
79

(1997).
83 See id, at 588, 701 A.2d at 1271.
84 See id- at 594, 701 A.2d at 1274-75.

See id. at 593, 701 A.2d at 1274.

86 See id. A prosecutor must submit evidence to a grand jury that makes
out a

prima facie case that the defendant committed the alleged sexual assault before the
grand jury will hand down an indictment. See id. at 594, 701 A.2d at 1274 (citing
Trap Rock Indus. v. Kohl, 59 N.J. 471, 487-88, 284 A.2d 161, 169 (1971)). By this
procedure, the due process rights of the defendant who is ordered to be tested for
HIV are protected. See id.
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cure a search warrant before they may search an individual's person,
property, or personal effects.8 7 The United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue of privacy and the application of the Fourth
Amendment in Boyd v. United States88 decided in 188689 The Boyd
Court extended Fourth Amendment protection to cover not only
personal property, but also personal privacy.90 Although much of the
Boyd decision focused on the Fourth Amendment's applicability to
criminal cases, the Court recognized that the government is prohibited from depriving a citizen of his or her rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures pertinent to a civil investigation.9 '

See Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)
(holding that searches by municipal safety and health inspectors conducted without
the warrant procedure violate the Fourth Amendment); see also supra note 1
(quoting the Fourth Amendment).
87

88

116 U.S. 616 (1886).

The Boyd Court scrutinized an act to amend the customs revenue laws. See id.
at 617. The act allowed the seizure of any goods imported with the intent of defrauding the government of proper duties and taxes owed. See id. The claimants
were ordered to produce evidence in the form of a previous invoice. See id. at 618.
The claimants objected to this procedure on the grounds that no defendant can be
compelled to produce evidence against himself and that the statute in question was
void and unconstitutional as far as it compelled such productions. See id.
90 See id. at 630. The Court, in Boyd, related the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment to the country's ties with Great Britain by focusing on a seminal British case
written by Lord Camden pertaining to the protection of personal property. See id. at
89

624-26. The Boyd Court noted:
The great end for which men entered into society was to secure their
property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all
instances where it has not been taken away or abridged by some public
law for the good of the whole .... By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man
can set his foot upon my ground without my license, but he is liable to
an action, though the damage be nothing, which is proved by every
declaration in trespass where the defendant is called upon to answer
for bruising the grass and even treading upon the soil.
Id. at 627 (citation omitted).
In finding that the Fourth Amendment extends to personal privacy, Justice
Bradley wrote:
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,
that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private
property, .where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of
some public offense, - it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment.
Id. at 630.
91 See id. at 634. Justice Bradley wrote, "It
is the duty of the courts to be watchful
for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon." Id at 635.
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92 afThe Court, in Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco,
firmed the proposition that the Fourth Amendment secures privacy
and protection against arbitrary government intrusions." The Camara Court addressed a specific portion of the San Francisco Housing Code that authorized warrantless inspections of apartments in
order to uncover possible housing code violations.94 The Court held
that a person has a constitutional right to refuse the inspection of his
or her premises without the issuance of a valid search warrant.9 5 The
Court observed that a warrantless search of private property was unreasonable. 9 The Court explained that the determination of when a
person's reasonable expectations of privacy give way to the government's right to search is a decision best left to the judiciary and not
to law enforcement officials.97 The controlling standard for the issuance of a search warrant, according to Camara, is reasonableness.
This standard, the Court explained, necessitates balancing the need
for the search against the personal invasion caused by the search. ' -

387 U.S. 523 (1967).
See id, at 528.
94 See id. at 525. A building manager informed the inspector
of possible code
violations by the lessee of the ground floor of the building. See id. at 526. The inspector attempted to gain access to the area where the alleged code violations existed. See id The lessee denied the inspector access because the inspector lacked a
search warrant. See id.
95 See id. at 540. The Court found that there was no urgency
in inspecting the
premises at a certain time. See id. The Court further observed that most citizens
voluntarily allow inspections and, thus, it seems proper that when a certain person
denies an inspector access, the warrant process should be adhered to unless there is
a citizen complaint or another valid reason that requires immediate entry. See id. at
639-40.
The Camara Court unequivocally dispelled the belief that the Fourth Amendment protected an individual only from criminal searches and seizures. See id. at
530. The Court noted:
It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior. For instance, even the most
law-abiding citizen has a very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances under which the sanctity of his home may be broken by official
authority, for the possibility of criminal entry under the guise of official sanction is a serious threat to personal and family security.
Id. at 530-31.
'A See id. at 528-29.
97 See id. at 529 (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
14 (1948)). The
Court noted that the ability to have a law enforcement officer enter one's private
domain is a legitimate concern not only to the individual being searched, but to an
ordered society grounded in the belief that there is a reasonable expectation of
freedom from being watched. See id. (citing Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14).
98 See Camara,387 U.S.
at 535.
99 See id. at 536-37.
The Court recognized several factors that point to the rea92

93
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Eighteen years later, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 1°° signs of erosion of
the strict warrant requirement crept into Fourth Amendment juris1 0 1 T.L.O., a student who
prudence.
was caught smoking in her
school's bathroom, was taken to the principal's office, where she denied the incident.'02 The principal searched her purse and found
cigarettes and evidence of drug use and drug-dealing activity.103 The
principal subsequently turned the drug-dealing evidence over to the
police. 01 4 T.L.O. challenged the legality of the principal's search and
the admissibility of the evidence obtained by that search on Fourth
Amendment grounds.'0 5
The Court dismissed the Fourth Amendment challenge, focusing on the need to balance the privacy interests of school children
against the need of school officials to maintain discipline in the
school.'06 The Court concluded that the constitutionality of a student
search should be premised upon that search's reasonableness, assessed under all surrounding circumstances.
Using this test, the
sonableness of code inspections. See id. at 537. The Court first considered the long
history of acceptance of code inspections by both the public and the judiciary. See
id. (citing Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 371 (1959)). Second, the Court considered the unlikelihood that any other search technique would be as effective as this
type of search. See id. Finally, the Court noted that the impersonal nature of the
searches mandated by municipal codes means that there is a relatively limited invasion of personal rights. See id.

100469 U.S. 325 (1985).

101 See id. at 358 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing
that applying a balancing test, rather than the constitutional probable cause standard, dangerously weakens the Fourth Amendment).
1o
See id at 328.
103 See id. The search produced rolling papers, small amounts of marijuana, plas-

tic bags, a pipe, a large number of one-dollar bills, and letters that implicated T.L.O.
in drug-dealing rings. See id.
104

See id.

105 See

id. at 329. T.L.O. also challenged the confession she made to police regarding her involvement in drug dealing on the grounds that the unlawful search
committed by the principal marred such a confession. See id.
A study of post-TL.O. cases indicates that in 1994, 31 of the 36 Fourth Amendment challenges to searches conducted in schools were deemed reasonable by
courts. SeeJoseph R. McKinney, The Fourth Amendment and the Public Schools: Reasonable Suspicion in the 1990s, 91 EDUC. L. REP. 455, 457. Two circuit courts have upheld
the use of strip searches where there is a suspicion of drug possession on school
property. See id. at 462. Students subjected to searches in school have now begun to
look increasingly towards state constitutions for protection as opposed to the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. See id. at 458.
IN See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339, 340. The Court noted that the warrant
requirement could not be applied to reasonable searches performed within the confines of
a school because it would interfere with the disciplinary procedures of such institutions in an adverse manner. See id. at 340.
107 See id.at 341.
The Court stated that the reasonableness of any search is dependent upon a two-part inquiry. See id The question must be asked "'whether
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Court determined that the Fourth Amendment does not require
schools to obtain search warrants
before searching students over
8
whom they have authority.

Four years later, the Court decided Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n'" and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,""
both of which expanded the ability of certain entities to perform
drug testing upon a well-defined group of individuals without securing a search warrant."' The Court premised its rulings on the finding
that blood and urine12 tests are searches within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.

The Von Raab Court held that suspicionless urine testing of employees seeking promotion to jobs that require intervening with illegal drugs and carrying a firearm is reasonable" 3 In making this determination, the Court focused on the fact that the drug-testing
scheme, set up to test certain specific customs officers, was not intended for law enforcement purposes." 4 The Court, therefore, applied a balancing test rather than the customary presumption in favor of the probable cause requirement outlined in the Fourth
Amendment's Warrant Clause." 5
The majority afforded substantial weight to the government's assertion that an officer who uses drugs may be more likely to succumb
the ...

action was justified at its inception' . . . [and] whether [it] 'was reasonably

related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place."' Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). The Court explained
the application of this test by stating that a search will be deemed reasonable at its
inception when there is a belief that the search will provide evidence of previous or
ongoing infractions of the law or school policy. See id. at 341-42. The scope of the
search will be deemed acceptable when "the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." Id. at 342.
108 See id. at 340. The courts provide pivotal authority
upon which school officials
rely when conducting searches. See McKinney, supra note 105, at 463. Presently,
school officials must exercise professional judgment in determining when the use of
that authority is appropriate. See id.
109 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
489 U.S. 656 (1989).
See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679; See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633-34.
13 See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at
679.
114 See id.
"5
See id.; see also supra note 2 (quoting the text of the Warrant Clause). The
Court balanced the government's compelling interest in not allowing drug users to
be promoted to positions in which such drug use would compromise the security of
America's borders against the expectation of privacy of the customs officers. See Von
Raab, 489 U.S. at 679. The Court determined that the officers had a decreased expectation of privacy due to the "physical and ethical demands of those positions."
Id,;
see also supra note 1 (quoting the text of the Fourth Amendment).
112 See
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to bribery and other temptations that inhere in the access to large
quantities of valuable property seized in the daily operations of Customs Service." 6 Justice Scalia, in dissent, took great offense at what
he viewed to be a significant erosion of the Fourth Amendment to
the point that mere speculation, unsupported by clear and convincing evidence, allows for a bodily search without a warrant."7
The Court in Skinner validated a mandatory drug-testing scheme
established by the Federal Railroad Administration to test railroad
employees involved in specified types of railroad accidents." 8 The
Court found that the interests of the government in preventing the
occurrence of railroad accidents outweigh the privacy concerns of
the railroad workers." 9 The Court concluded that the testing was
reasonable given that the scheme advanced the compelling state interest of railway safety.'2 ' The Court determined this despite the fact
that the statute required neither
individualized suspicion nor a war12
rant to perform the testing. '
116 See

Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 669.

See id at 684 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Justice Scalia wrote:
What is absent in the Government's justification - notably absent, revealingly absent, and as far as I am concerned dispositively absent - is
the recitation of even a single instance in which any of the speculated
horribles actually occurred: an instance, that is, in which the cause of
bribe-taking, or of poor aim, or of unsympathetic law enforcement, or
of compromise of classified information, was drug use .... But if such
a generalization suffices to justify demeaning bodily searches.., then
the Fourth Amendment has become frail protection indeed.
Id, at 683-84 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11 See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 633 (1989). The
scheme confers upon the railroad the task of collecting both blood and urine samples for testing. See id. at 609.
1"9 See id, at 633. The Court emphasized that there is a decreased
expectation of
privacy by employees who work in an industry regulated by the government for
safety reasons. See id at 627. The Court stated:
Though some of the privacy interests implicated by the toxicological
testing at issue reasonably might be viewed as significant in other contexts, logic and history show that a diminished expectation of privacy
attaches to information relating to the physical condition of covered
employees and to this reasonable means of procuring such information.
Id. at 628. The Court recognized that the privacy concerns raised by the statutory
drug-testing under scrutiny may be substantial in other situations, but considering
the diminished expectation of privacy by railroad employees, the drug testing is a
reasonable means of gathering such information. See id.
17

12 See id. at 633-34. The Court also observed that the testing scheme
gave limited
discretion to railroads in determining which employees should be tested. See id.
121 See id. at 634. The Court also noted that imposing a warrant
obligation before
conducting urine or blood tests on railroad employees would not increase the protections of certainty and regularity already provided by the railroad's testing provi-
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22
In 1997, in Chandlerv. Miller,1
the Supreme Court considered a
Georgia statute that required candidates running for state office to
submit to and pass a drug test prior to being placed on an election
ballot.21 3 The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional after
balancing the state's interest in having drug-free elected officials
against the proposed candidates' interests in privacy. 2 4 The Court
noted that there must be an important governmental need that allows compromising the Fourth Amendment's individualized
suspi25
cion requirement prior to conducting a warrantless search.
The Court distinguished Von Raab by pointing out the inherent
difficulties in monitoring the day-to-day work of customs agents.' 2

sions. See id.at 624. Indeed, the Court observed that a warrant requirement would
hinder the governmental purpose for such testing regulations. See id.
The decisions in Skinner and Von Raab have been criticized as compromising the
Fourth Amendment balance that the framers of the Constitution struck and diluting
the Fourth Amendment protections guaranteed. See Andrea Lewis, Comment, Drug
Testing: Can Privacy Interests Be Protected Under the "Special Needs" Doctrine?, 56 BROOK.
L. REV. 1013, 1044 (1990). In particular, the Court has been criticized for accepting
the "special needs" doctrine and eliminating the need for probable cause in any
search operating outside of the criminal context. See id In cases that address civil
searches, the "special needs" test only requires a showing that personal privacy interests are outweighed by the interests possessed by the government. See id. at 1034.
Critics argue that the framers of the Constitution intended the Fourth Amendment
balance to favor individual privacy. See id. at 1035 (citing United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 722 (1983) (Blackmun,J., concurring)). They further argue that the delicate balance struck by the framers should not be disregarded for the sake of convenience. See id.
122 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997).
123 See id. at 1298-99.
14 See id.
at 1301, 1305. The state's interest in the testing of candidates for office
is premised upon the fact that the use of illegal drugs by state officials undermines
that person's credibility and authority, interferes with his or her ability to perform
basic job functions, and compromises public respect for and confidence in elected
state officials. See id. at 1303.
125 See id. at 1303. The Court noted that the counsel
for respondents admitted
that absent from the record and Georgia's state government is any indication that
drug use is a problem among elected officials. See id. The Court also noted that
Georgia's testing scheme did not effectively deter candidates from using drugs because candidates themselves chose when to submit to the testing, and thus could
calculate how long drug use must be suspended prior to their scheduled drug test.
See id. at 1304.
126 See id. at 1304. The Court indicated that it simply was
impossible to scrutinize
the work of a customs agent, whose job required him or her to carry a firearm and
have ready access to drugs and drug smugglers. See id. (citing National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989)).
In essence, the Court rejected the Von Raab characterization that a "special
need" could exist without a showing of a recognized evil and a well known consequence of this evil. See Nathan A. Brown, Reigning In the National Drug Testing Epidemic: Chandler v. Miller, 117 S.Ct. 1295 (1997), 33 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 253,
271. Chandler signals the return of the requirement that suspicionless searches be
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The Court noted that the duties of elected government officials are
performed largely in an office setting where it is more feasible to
monitor job performance and detect drug use without the personal
privacy invasion of mandatory drug testing. 21 In rendering the
Georgia statute unconstitutional, the Court asserted that wellintended symbolic gestures, such as making a statement against drug
28
use, are insufficient to overcome Fourth Amendment protections.
Against this background of precedent, the New Jersey Supreme
Court, in State ex rel. J.G., N.S. andfJ.T,' 2 held that New Jersey's statutes authorizing mandatory HIV testing for accused or convicted sex
offenders are constitutional.'"0 Further, the court noted that due
process is not violated by
requiring an indicted suspect to submit
1 3
blood samples for testing. '

Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Poritz began by
stating that the blood test proposed by the testing statutes is a search
and that the court's inquiry must be limited to whether that search
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Paragraphs 1 and 7 of the New Jersey Constitution.132 The chief justice noted that the analysis used to determine the constitutionality of the statutes under the Fourth Amendnarrowly tailored to serve a legitimate governmental interest. See id. at 272.
17 See Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1304.
In making this comparison, the Court concluded that Georgia wanted to set an example in its testing scheme for its citizens
and thus it is a more symbolic gesture rather than a "special need" and does not fall
within a compelling interest allowing warrantless and suspicionless searches. See id.
at 1304-05.
Despite the lack of an explicit rejection of the Von Raab holding, Chandlereffectively limits suspicionless searches on all classes of people because the Chandler
Court found that politicians, although elite members of society, have no greater privacy protection than the average office worker or unarmed Customs agent. See
Brown, supra note 126, at 272. See id.
128 See Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1305.
The Court stated:
"Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment
by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding."
Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(1928)).
29
151 NJ. 565, 701 A.2d 1260 (1997).
30 See id. at 570, 701 A.2d at 1262.
131

See id.

See id. at 576, 701 A.2d at 1265. The court relied upon the Supreme Court's
determination in Skinner. See id. In Skinner, the Court maintained that drawing
blood for alcohol analysis constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. See
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (citing Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966)).
132
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ment sufficed to determine constitutionality under the New Jersey
Constitution. 3 s The court reasoned that it had to balance the infringements on the juveniles' rights against the government goals
The court took note of the fact
that support those infringements.'
that the State presented no evidence as to the benefits served by
court-ordered HIV testing, however, the court assumed that the Legislature had determined that the H1V status of an attacker can be
beneficial to both the treating doctors and the victim.

3

5

The chief

justice stated that knowledge of an attacker's HIV status would allow
the victim to begin post-exposure HIV treatments early if the results
are positive, and it would allow the victim to allay some of the concerns of possible exposure if the results are negative.136
In cases in which exceptions to the Fourth Amendment Warrant
Clause apply, the court recounted that to make a warrantless search
reasonable, there usually must be some evidence raising suspicion
about the target of that search.'3 7 However, if the requirement of individualized suspicion might compromise the governmental interest
involved, and there is minimal intrusion on privacy interests, the
court indicated that the individualized suspicion requirement may be
waived.13 8

In making these observations, the court concluded that

federal precedent mandated that the court apply the "special needs"
analysis to determine whether the testing statutes were constitutional
under the Fourth Amendment. 9
SeeJG., 151 N.J. at 578, 701 A.2d 1266.
See id. at 581, 701 A.2d at 1267. The court explained that, in the instance of a
criminal investigation, the balance is usually weighed heavily in favor of following
the procedures of the Warrant Clause incorporated in the Fourth Amendment. See
id. at 576-77, 701 A.2d at 1265. However, the court noted that exceptions to the
Warrant Clause exist when "'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and the probable cause requirement impracticable."
Id. at 577, 701 A.2d at 1265 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619).
15 See id, at 584, 701 A.2d at 1269. The court assumed that the Legislature, in
enacting the laws, knew of the medical and scientific information available on HIV
and AIDS and took this information under advisement. See id.
'3 See id. at 584-86, 701 A.2d 1269-71. The majority noted that the price of postexposure treatment may deter many victims from actually availing themselves of
such treatment, but there is medical treatment available. See id. at 584, 701 A.2d
1269. The court explained that knowing the HV status of an attacker can prevent
some of the long-term anxiety that can follow a sexual assault while the victim is unsure of his or her HIV status. See id, at 586, 701 A.2d 1270. The court, however,
stated that a positive HIV test result from the attacker can significantly increase the
victim's anxiety before he or she learns of his or her own HIV status. See id.
137
See id. at 577, 701 A.2d at 1265-66.
1
See id., 701 A.2d at 1266 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624).
159
Seej.G., 151 NJ. at 578, 701 A.2d at 1266. The court noted several recent Supreme Court decisions regarding the use of bodily searches for reasons other than
133
134
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Chief Justice Poritz next turned to whether mandatory HIV testing for accused or convicted sex offenders is one of the instances
wherein suspicionless searches are appropriate. 4 0 The court determined that the requirement of individualized suspicion would compromise the state's purpose behind the testing statute because many
of the HIV symptoms are latent.14' The latent nature of HIV symptoms makes individualized suspicion of one's HIV status impossible
instances because the test is needed to provide that informain many
42
tion.

Continuing, the court undertook an analysis of the privacy interests of the juveniles.4 3 ChiefJustice Poritz first noted that, because
a blood test is a standard medical procedure, the privacy intrusion of
such a test is limited.' 44 The chief justice opined, however, that the
statutory testing is actually more invasive than the intrusion of merely
because of the nature of the information
taking the blood sample
45
provided by the test.1

The court next weighed the governmental interest in testing
against the privacy rights of the individuals.'4 6 The court conveyed
that the government's interests in the testing procedure are to facilitate the ability to receive post-exposure treatment and to promote
to conduct criminal investigations in which the "special needs" balancing test was
applied. See id. at 577, 701 A.2d at 1266. Specifically, the chiefjustice alluded to the
Court's decisions in such cases as Chandler v. Miller, 117 S.Ct. 1295 (1997) (applying
the "special needs" test to deem unconstitutional a Georgia statute requiring candidates for elected office to submit to drug testing); National Treasury Employees Union
v.Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (applying the "special needs" analysis to the drugtesting program enacted by the Customs Service); and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (applying the "special needs" analysis to deem unconstitutional a policy of drug testing railroad employees involved in certain types of
accidents).
The "special needs" analysis also serves the interests of the New Jersey State
Constitution. See NewJersey Transit PBA Local 304 v. NewJersey Transit Corp., 151
N.J. 531, 556, 701 A.2d 1243, 1255 (1997).- The court in New Jersey Transit PBA
stated, "We find that the special needs test provides a useful analytical framework for
considering the protections afforded by Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey
Constitution and adopt this approach in our review ..." Id.
:' SeeJG., 151 N.J. at 578, 701 A.2d at 1266 (citing Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1298).
4
See id at 579, 701 A.2d at 1267.
142 See id. (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623; In rejuveniles A,
B, C, D, E, 847 P.2d
455, 459 (Wash. 1993)).
143
See id.
144 See id. at 579-80, 701
A.2d at 1267.
145 See id. at 580, 701 A.2d at 1267. The court noted that "'there
still exists a risk
of much harm from non-consensual dissemination of the information that an individual is inflicted with AIDS.'' Id. (quoting Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth.,
72 F.3d 1133, 1140 (3d Cir. 1995)).
146
SeeJG., 151 N.J. at 581, 701 A.2d at 1267.
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the mental healing of the victims by providing them access to essential information about the HIV status of their assailants.'4 7 After concluding that these interests are legitimate state interests, the court determined that the analysis hinged on whether the statutes sufficiently
advanced their stated goals.'4 8 The court noted that, despite the
State's failure to provide any expert testimony as to the benefits of
court-ordered HIV-testing statutes, some members of the medical
community believe that knowing the HIV status of the attacker can
be beneficial to the victim. 149
The court then considered the privacy protections built into the
testing statutes.' 50 The court noted that only the victim is allowed to
request testing 5' and that the test results have an extremely limited
See id, 701 A.2d at 1267-68. The government claimed that this statute exhibited the Legislature's interest in the physical and emotional well-being of the victim
of sexual assault. See id.
The court took notice of the recent upsurge in public and political interest in
the rights of victims. See id. at 581-82, 701 A.2d at 1268. The court recognized that,
in New Jersey, three statutes have been enacted since 1985 for the advancement of
victim's rights: The Crime Victim's Bill of Rights, codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B34-8 (West 1995), which assures that a victim is treated with compassion and dignity,
is not subject to intimidation, and suffers minimal inconvenience resulting from
criminal proceedings; the Victim Counselor Privilege Act, codified at N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:84A-22.13 to 22.15 (West 1995), which mandates in part that a counselor assert
a testimonial privilege regarding confidential communications he or she had with a
crime victim; and the Victim Impact Statute, codified at N.J. STAT. ANN § 2C:11-3c(6)
(West Supp. 1998), which allows the State at a sentencing proceeding, if the defendant chooses to present character evidence of his own in hopes of mitigating his sentence, to present evidence of a murder victim's character and the impact that such a
murder had on the victim's family. SeejG., 151 N.J. at 582, 701 A.2d at 1268. In addition, the court observed that New Jersey voters approved a Victim's Rights
Amendment to the NewJersey Constitution in 1991, included as Article I, Paragraph
22. See id. ChiefJustice Poritz explained that these New Jersey statutes are in addition to those initiatives taken by the federal government, including the Victims of
Crime Act of 1984 codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10601 to 10605 (1994) and the Victims'
Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10606 to 10607 (1994).
SeejG., 151 N.J. at 581, 701 A.2d at 1268.
SeejG., 151 N.J. at 583, 701 A.2d at 1269. Thejuveniles did not challenge the
stated purpose of the testing statutes or that the government had a compelling interest in enacting victim's rights legislation. See id; see also supra note 65-70
(explaining the defendants' expert witnesses' testimony that argued that courtmandated HIV testing does not provide a victim with reliable evidence of his or her
own HIV status).
149 SeeJG., 151 N.J. at 584, 587, 701 A.2d at 1269, 1271.
Based upon this diversity
of opinion and the constantly evolving nature of the knowledge of HIV and AIDS,
the court concluded that it should be extremely reluctant to disregard a victim's desire to know the HIV status of his or her alleged attacker. See id at 587, 701 A.2d at
1271.
'50 See
id.
151 See id The court noted that only in the event that victims are minors
can parents request testing of the suspected or convicted rapist and have the results dis147
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scope of disclosure. 52 In weighing these factors, Chief Justice Poritz
deemed court-ordered HIV testing of convicted or suspected sex offenders to be reasonable because the potential benefits of HIV testing to the
victims of sexual assault overshadow the offender's privacy
53
1

interest.

The court, however, placed a limiting factor on the reasonableness of court-ordered HIV testing. 54 The court reasoned that, when
there has been no possibility of transmission of HIV, it is unreasonable to compromise the attacker's privacy by administering an HIV
test.' 55 The court noted that the New Jersey testing laws adopted a
broad definition of sexual penetration. 56 The court determined that
because bodily fluid transfer does not occur in some acts covered by
57
this definition, HIV transmission is impossible in those instances.'
Therefore, ChiefJustice Poritz held that in order for a court to corn-

closed directly to them. See id. In all other cases, only the victim can request and
receive the results of the HIV test. See id.
152 See id. The court noted that the NewJersey
statute allows for disclosure only to
the victim, the attacker, and the Office of Victim Witness Advocacy. See id. The statute must be read to place reasonable limitations on to whom the victim can disclose
the HIV status of the attacker. See id.; see also supra note 41 (quoting the text of the
New Jersey HIV-testing statutes).
Additionally, the court stated that federal law provides some further guidance
in interpreting the limited scope of disclosure intended for mandatory HIV tests. See
42 U.S.C. § 14011 (b) (5) (1994) ("The victim may disclose the test results only to any
medical professional, counselor, family member or sexual partner(s) the victim may
have had since the attack. Any such individual to whom the test results are disclosed
by the victim shall maintain the confidentiality of such information.").
53 SeejG., 151 N.J. at 588, 701
A.2d at 1271.
54 See id.
155
See id. at 589, 701 A.2d at 1272. The court reiterated the fact that it has been
scientifically proven that HIV is transmitted only when certain bodily fluids of one
person come in contact with the blood or mucous membranes of another person.
See id. at 588, 701 A.2d at 1271-72 (citing HELENA BRETr-SMITH & GERALD H.
FREILAND, TRANsMISSION AND TREATMENT IN AIDS LAW TODAY: A NEW GUIDE FOR THE
PUBUC 23 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 2d ed. 1993)). Thus, the court concluded, HIV

transfer is impossible where the potential for transfer of bodily fluids from one individual to another is not present. See id. at 589, 701 A.2d at 1272.
'5 See id.
157
See id. For the purposes of New Jersey's court-ordered HIV-testing statutes,
sexual penetration is defined as "vaginal intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio or anal
intercourse between persons or the insertion of the hand, finger or object into the
anus or vagina either by the actor or upon the actor's instruction." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:14-1c. (West 1995). By this definition, the court reasoned that sexual penetration is not limited to activities where there exists the possibility for the exchange of
bodily fluids. SeejG., 151 N.J. at 589, 701 A.2d at 1272. Thus, the court determined
that the state's HIV-testing statutes could lead to HIV testing where the possibility of
HIV transfer is negligible or absent. See id.
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pel HIV testing, the victim must demonstrate probable cause of HIV
transmission due to the probable transfer of bodily fluids.1 58
The chief justice next turned to the juveniles' due process
claims.' 59 The court addressed the contention that due process requires a hearing to establish probable cause both that the defendant
committed sexual assault and that a transfer of bodily fluids occurred.' fO ChiefJustice Poritz explained that, because the court's application of the statute requires probable cause to believe that bodily
fluids were transferred during a sexual assault, there is no due process violation. 6 '
Lastly, the court dismissed the juveniles' contention that their
constitutional rights of privacy and liberty were violated because the
testing statutes do not include procedural safeguards to protect those
who have not yet been convicted of a crime.12 The court stated that
in order to subject a defendant to HIV testing the defendant must be
formally charged or convicted. 3 A formal charge, the court explained, requires the State to establish probable cause to believe that
the defendant committed a sexual assault or the equivalent."6 The
158

Seej.G., 151 N.J. at 590, 701 A.2d at 1272. The court determined that the re-

quirement to show probable cause that a transfer of bodily fluids took place ensures
that the interests of both the state and the convicted or accused will be adequately
addressed and served. See id. at 590-91, 701 A.2d at 1273. The court stated:
Before a court may order HIV testing of sex offenders pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2.2 or N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43.1, the court must find that
probable cause exists to believe that the victim may have been exposed
to the bodily fluids of the assailant such that there is a possibility of
transmission of the AIDS virus. If the court makes such a finding, the
testing authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2.2 and N.J.S.A. 2A:4AA-43.1 will
comport with the requirements of both the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the NewJersey
Constitution.
Id. at 592, 701 A.2d at 1273. The court articulated the definition of probable cause
as "'a well grounded suspicion or belief."' Id. at 591, 701 A.2d at 1273 (quoting State
v. DeSimone, 60 N.J. 319, 322, 288 A.2d 849, 850 (1972)). The court elaborated that
"probable cause is not a stringent standard, but does require 'something more than
a raw, unsupported suspicion."' Id. (quoting State ex ret A.J., 232 N.J. Super. 274,
286, 556 A.2d 1283, 1289-90 (App. Div. 1989)).
159 See id. at 593, 701 A.2d at 1274.
1GOSee id.
161
162

See id.
See id.

1' See id.

SeeJG., 151 NJ. at 594, 701 A.2d at 1274. The court noted that a grand jury
indictment requires that the State build a prima facie case that that particular defendant committed the crime of sexual assault. See id. The court further stated that
a similar prima facie case must be established even in instances in which a defendant
waives the right to an indictment. See id. Chief Justice Poritz explained that in the
instance ofjuveniles, a summons may not be issued unless there is probable cause to
16
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court found that the probable cause requirement was sufficient to
safeguard due process."
Taking into account the public stigma surrounding the AIDS
epidemic and the compelling interest of sexual-assault victims to
know the HIV status of their attackers, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that the court-ordered testing schemes are reasonable
searches under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraphs 1 and 7 of the New Jersey ConstituAccordingly, the
tion as they were applied to J.G., N.S. and J.T.'
court upheld the appellate division's ruling, but modified it to require probable cause to believe that the transfer of bodily fluids
might have taken place between the accused assailant and the alleged
victim.

67

The court emphasized that the state has a compelling in-

terest in providing victims with knowledge of the HIV status of their
attackers only when this probable cause showing exists.'68
Several factors contribute to the recent judicial acceptance of
New Jersey's court-ordered HIV-testing statutes. The nation as a
whole has embraced a shift toward meeting the needs of victims of
violent crimes. "0 A strong foundation for AIDS- and HIV-related legislation is found in the extent to which AIDS and HIV have touched
1 70
the lives of and embedded a sense of fear in the people of America.
HIV-testing statutes
It is, therefore, not surprising that court-ordered
1 71
have become a national phenomenon.
Critics allege that knowing the HIV status of the attacker does
not provide a victim with any useful information that will contribute
to his or her healing, either physically or emotionally.'72 There is no
conclude that the juvenile has in fact been delinquent. See id

The chief justice re-

minded that a conviction still requires that the State prove every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 593-94, 701 A.2d at 1274.
165 See id at 593, 701 A.2d at 1274.
1 See id. at 594, 701 A.2d at 1274-75.
See id
See id. at 594, 701 A.2d at 1275.
1
See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing the recent upsurge in
public and political interest in victim's rights).
170 See supra notes 21-35 (discussing the extent to which AIDS has affected Ameri167

1

can society).
1
See Blender, supra note 36, at 477-78 (observing that when Congress enacted
42 U.S.C. § 3756(f) in 1990, approximately one third of all states had already signed
legislation mandating that some form of HIV and AIDS testing be performed on sex
offenders). With the passage of this federal statute, Congress intended to encourage
the remainder of the states to sign similar mandatory testing legislation. See id at
478.
172

See Kathy Barrett Carter, Rape Victims' Rights Reign Over Privacy of Suspects: Abil-

ity to Demand H1V Test Upheld, STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 26, 1997, at 25. The American Civil
Liberties Union found a complete lack of any benefit advanced by the New Jersey
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better person, however, to decide whether there is any benefit to
knowing the HIV status of an attacker than the victim. If a victim desires to know the full extent to which he or she has been placed in
harm's way, such information should be provided, even at the expense of the defendant's privacy. Furthermore, if a victim believes
that no benefit will be derived from knowing the HIV status of the attacker, the victim will not request that information and the criminal
defendant will be spared the obligation to disclose such information.
Undoubtedly, compelling convicted sex offenders to produce
blood samples for HIV testing is easier to justify than is compelling a
merely suspected sex offender. However, the American legal system
incarcerates men and women every day prior to conviction. While
incarcerated, there is a diminished expectation of privacy. 173

Court-

ordered HIV testing is merely a minimal extension of that decreased
expectation of privacy, if indeed it is an extension at all. This is especially true if the information sought will minimize the emotional
trauma the victim suffers or will allow post-exposure treatment. The
benefits of H1V-testing statutes outweigh the detriments to the privacy interests of accused or convicted sexual offenders.
Justin P. Runke

court-ordered HIV-testing statutes. See id.
173 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527-28 (1984) (holding that a prisoner
has no right to privacy in his or her cell under the Fourth Amendment because such
a right is fundamentally at odds with the prison environment requiring continuous
observation); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979) (upholding the practice of
conducting visual body cavity searches on any inmate, whether they were convicted
or awaiting trial, after that inmate had contact with a visitor from outside of the

prison because such searches are reasonable in an effort to maintain discipline and
order among inmates).

